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“But in neither case does [creating a trademark] depend upon novelty, in-
vention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, 
no genius, no laborious thought.”
– U.S. Supreme Court, 1879.1
Trademarks are used throughout the world to expedite commercial interac-
tions and aid consumer decision-making.  When governments step in to ensure that 
certain trademarks are used only by their corresponding owners and nobody else, 
companies are able to forge bonds with their consumer bases and consumers can 
feel assured of a uniform quality of products that they choose.  Trademarks are tra-
ditionally based on certain pillars which define what they are and how they can be 
used. Territoriality and actual use in commerce are those traditional pillars.  This 
seemingly simple construct is upset however, when a company’s trademark be-
comes famous.  Through the technological wonders of the twenty-first century, it is 
now possible to become exposed to all the world’s trademarks without even leav-
ing your couch.  This presents a problem when certain trademarks are exposed to a 
relevant consumer population that does not have ready access to the products tied 
to those marks and that population makes a source connection with the goods.  
For all the reasons that governments protect trademarks used at home, it is 
equally important to protect famous trademarks which are not.  But the United 
States has been slow to standardize this 62 protection.  Although implementing the 
protection will not be easy, it is an important thing for America to do.  By follow-
ing the steps outlined in this note, we can institute real standardized protection for 
truly famous trademarks.  If we fail to take these steps, we will continue to be pla-
gued by a mire of conflicting case law and unsure protections.  It is unfortunate 
that today’s trademark law in such an important area is in such disarray.
1 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a convenience store unlike the ones that populate American street 
corners today.  Imagine a convenience store without brightly lit coolers full of soda 
and other beverages.  Imagine instead, rows and rows of blacked out soda coolers.  
Customers who shop at this convenience store are required to reach into a dar-
kened cooler in order to select their beverages without knowing what they would 
get.  Common sense tells us that this convenience store would quickly go out of 
business.  Consumers would be upset by the uncertainty that such a store would 
provide.  Soda companies would dislike this convenience store because their loyal 
customers could not find and purchase their favorite products consistently.  
Trademarks are a way of shedding light on the dark soda cooler.  Trademarks 
allow customers to establish a source connection with a particular brand.  This 
source connection gives consumers the capability of making informed decisions 
about the brands that they purchase.  This source connection also gives the compa-
nies who own the marks the ability to establish goodwill with their consumers who 
become loyal to their favorite brands.  A symbiotic relationship is created by 
trademarks in a capitalist economy wherein the consumer and producer rely on one 
another to remain as predictable as possible. 
It is therefore in everyone’s best interest for governments to protect trade-
marks.  If fraudulent parties could hijack trademarks and fool the consuming pub-
lic, the symbiotic relationships would fail.  Government regulation is a good tool to 
ensure that trademarks do what they are supposed to do in a capitalist economy.  
With the power to regulate comes a responsibility to ensure fair play.  A careful 
balance must be struck with the regulation of trademarks: they must be protected to 
ensure the symbiotic relationships stay alive, but they must also be awarded to only 
those who actually use them in commerce and therefore create the source connec-
tion with consumers.  
Maintaining protection of trademarks to only those actually used in com-
merce is a very important pillar of trademark law.  A hoarding system would 
evolve if parties were allowed to retain rights to trademarks and not be required to 
actually use them in commerce.  Hoarding trademarks is counterproductive to a 
capitalist economy’s competitive system.  Hoarding does not reward those who are 
actively trading in the economy, but rather those who stagnate it.
Another pillar to trademark law, beyond necessitating actual use of a 
trademark, is that of territoriality.2
2 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-
State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 886, 891 (2004) (questioning the trademark territoriality principle has been 
questioned by a number of leading scholars, including Graeme B. Dinwoodie). 
This pillar stems from the historical context of 
trademark usage where brands were only used in commerce in certain geographic 
areas.  Because of limitations in historical product distribution, companies only 
needed trademark protection where their trademarks were affixed to products phys-
ically sold in those locations.  Where two companies’ products were sold in the 
same geographical area, the rule under United States common law became that the 
first to use a trademark in a particular area won the rights to use the trademark in 
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that area.3
Over time however, this traditional territorial model began to break down.  
With the advent of newer technologies, it became easier for companies to produce 
and ship goods to many places.  Mass media tools such as radio and magazines al-
lowed for a broader base of consumers to be exposed to more and more products.  
Once this hyper exposure began to take place, the traditional definitions of why 
trademarks were protected began to erode.
Later users of the trademark were barred from entering that particular 
marketplace with a trademark which was already established there.  
To help explain, we will go back to the soda cooler example.  What is it 
about certain brands that keep consumers coming back?  It may be personal expe-
rience with that brand.  It may be word-of-mouth recommendations.  It may be a 
catchy advertisement that has convinced someone to try a new label.  In the histor-
ical setting, these forces were only exerted on consumers who had the ability to 
purchase brands at the local level because companies only advertised products 
where their products were physically sold.  A consumer would not have exposure 
to a brand if it were not sold in her area.  A person would not likely hear a word-
of-mouth recommendation for a brand not available at her local store.  
But with the expansion of mass media, things changed.  Suddenly, consum-
ers were exposed to brands that were not sold in their geographic location.  They 
were presented with the opportunity to create a source connection with these 
trademarks.  This presented a problem for the traditional trademark model and 
raised the question: do trademarks warrant protection if consumers have created a 
source connection with the brand, even if that brand is not locally available to 
those consumers?  
This question has been encapsulated in the “well-known” or “famous” marks 
doctrine.  This doctrine supports the idea that trademarks deserve protection if they 
are well-known, or famous enough to given consumers, even if those consumers 
cannot physically purchase the goods or services to which the trademarks are af-
fixed.  The doctrine assumes that for all of the same reasons that local trademarks 
should be protected, so should trademarks which are famous to a given popula-
tion.4
This note will analyze the state of American law with regard to the idea of 
protecting famous foreign trademarks in the twenty-first century.  It will analyze 
the history of the doctrine in America and briefly describe the problems associated 
with historical attempts at protection.  It will highlight the most current cases deal-
ing with the issue and critique the way courts have attempted, or avoided, protect-
ing famous trademarks.  It will then conclude with recommendations on how to 
best protect famous foreign trademarks in America, while recognizing that imple-
mentation is not without its difficulties. 
3
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metacalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v. Theodore 
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
4 The famous marks doctrine is commonly referred to and discussed in case books nationwide, 
including, JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, 148 (4th ed. 
2007), see also Dinwoodie, supra note 2 (discussing in-depth the idea that trademarks may deserve pro-
tection beyond where they are affixed to a product sold in a particular area, also known as the famous 
marks doctrine).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.  Implementing Protection for Famous Foreign Trademarks Is Not a New 
Problem
Interestingly enough, the problem of whether and how to afford protection to 
famous trademarks is not a new dilemma.  We, today in the “age of technology and 
information,” think that the global marketplace is something we invented after 
1990.  But the roots of this problem date back quite some time.  The following qu-
otation by New York Supreme Court Justice Shientag in 1936 is exemplary: The 
“current” state of trademark law in the area of territoriality “in these days of rapid 
and constant intercommunication between States and nations” is in “a most unsa-
tisfactory state.”5
Justice Shientag lamented in 1936 that new technology was shaking the 
foundations of traditional trademark territoriality principles.  Airplanes, radio, tele-
phone, rail and auto travel were effectively shrinking the world in 1936.6
Fame has been defined as “the condition of being known or talked about by 
many people, [especially] on account of notable achievements.”
But 
whether you are talking about depression era radio or twenty-first century video 
chat rooms, the fundamental difficulties of protecting famous trademarks are the 
same.  This difficulty focuses on the definition of “fame” itself.  Without a good 
test of determining which trademarks are famous, and therefore deserving of pro-
tection, the famous trademarks doctrine struggles.  
7
It is no wonder, then, that historically the question of fame has been a diffi-
cult one for courts to deal with.  But to best understand where the famous marks 
doctrine is today, an analysis of its history and origins is appropriate.
This definition 
creates problems for those who wish to quantify the test for fame.  The definition 
largely depends on polling the thoughts of “many people” without specifying how 
many that could be.  To compound the problem, the results of an inquiry into fame 
will depend heavily upon the sample set of the people polled.  
B.  History of the Famous Foreign Marks Doctrine in America
The analysis begins in nineteenth-century Paris.  The Paris Convention of 
1883 was the seminal international conference regarding trademark law and the 
protection of trademarks generally.8  The Paris Convention is still regarded as the 
basis for trademark law in many global jurisdictions.9
5 Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 557 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
Parts of the original conven-
tion text and its revised texts were integrated into the 1994 TRIPS agreement, the 
6 Alexis Weisberger, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An International Perspec-
tive on the Viability of the Famous / Well-Known Marks Doctrine,  24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 
740 (2006).
7 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 611 (2001).
8 Clark W. Lackert, Famous Marks: Dilution from an International Perspective, 476 PLI/PAT 87,
96 (1997) (“[T]he most influential international convention on the question of patents and trademarks is 
the so-called Paris Convention.”).
9
Id.
66 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:I
most recent international intellectual property agreement.10
This important document actually included protection for well-known marks 
in a 1925 revision.  The provision was found in Article 6bis:
Marks: Well–Known Marks
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, 
or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to 
prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a 
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent au-
thority of the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country as be-
ing already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used 
for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential 
part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well–known mark or an imi-
tation liable to create confusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed for 
requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the Union may provide 
for a period within which the prohibition of use must be requested.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition of 
the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.11
Article 6bis demonstrates that protecting well-known marks is important in a 
global economic perspective.  And because this article was one incorporated into 
and built upon in the TRIPS agreement, Article 16-2 and 16-3 to which the United 
States is a signatory, the question of well-known marks in America should be a set-
tled point.  But it isn’t.  American courts have ruled that the Paris Convention is 
not self-executing American law.12
But if the Paris Convention isn’t the source of law regarding protection of 
famous trademarks, then what is?  Are there other statutes in effect to otherwise 
protect famous trademarks?
Therefore, protection of well-known or fam-
ous marks in America is not settled by the Paris Convention, despite the American 
signature on it.  
C.  The Lanham Act Provides No Statutory Foundation
In America, statutes are usually called upon to standardize a particular area 
of law.  Common law can be difficult to discern and is susceptible to change, on 
the whim of a judge.  Because of this, and because the American Congress realized 
10 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (specifically incorporating Paris Conven-
tion article 6bis into TRIPS Article 16.3: “Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mu-
tatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is 
registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a 
connection between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that 
the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use”).
11 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 6bis July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
12
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 160 (2d Cir. 2007); see also In re Rath, 402 F.3d 
1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2009 FAMOUS TRADEMARK PROTECTION 67
that trademark protection was vital to the American economy, a set of federal sta-
tutes were created in 1947.13 These statutes became known as the “Lanham Act,”
Title 15 of the U.S. Code.  The problem with discussing the well-known marks 
doctrine in statutory American law is that the Lanham Act has no such provision.14
So, what does it mean that the only substantive American statute dealing 
with trademarks is devoid of a section dealing with the protection of famous for-
eign trademarks?  The answer is that the doctrine has lacked firm bedrock from 
which to grow.  Instead of evolving from a uniform written law, it has grown from 
state court common law.  This means that protection of famous foreign marks has 
lacked a uniformity of treatment throughout the country.  Different courts have 
branched off and used their own precedent with which to rule.15 Different policies 
of how to protect famous foreign marks have spawned.16 The ramifications of this 
unsteady picture have caused great confusion as to what trademarks deserve pro-
tection in America and how one can go about ensuring that protection.17
D.  Protection for Famous Foreign Marks in America is Only Found in 
Common Law
Because the well-known or famous foreign marks doctrine is not in the Lan-
ham Act and has therefore never been codified federally, courts have been left with 
only common law to protect such marks.  But common law is not uniform.  Nor is 
it predictable.  Most courts have historically chosen the very broad doctrine en-
titled “unfair competition” in their attempts to protect famous foreign trade-
marks.18 This expansive, equity-seeking doctrine was first used by courts to recti-
fy morally suspect situations where famous foreign trademarks were copycatted.19
13
See Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Note that this was the 
second attempt at a federal trademark statute.  The first was struck down as unconstitutional in 1879 by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82.
And after surveying the case law which used such methods, it becomes apparent 
that because principles of equity are so ethereal, it is difficult to understand what 
standards, if any, courts used to protect famous foreign marks. 
14
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 2006). It is important to distinguish here what was expressly 
inserted as § 43(c) into the Lanham Act in 1995 which was meant to protect against dilution of “famous 
marks.”  This law only protects marks that are registered or used in the United States.  Id. So, in order 
to be precise, we should characterize the topic of this note as dealing with famous foreign marks which 
aren’t affixed to products sold in America, distinct from domestically used famous marks with which 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act deals.  This is known alternately as the “well-known” marks doc-
trine.  
15 E.g., Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); ITC Ltd. v. Pun-
chgini, Inc., 880 N.E. 852 (N.Y. 2007).
16
See Supra note 15.
17
See Supra note 15.
18
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1126(b) (West 2002).  Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act  mentions unfair 
competition as a foundational ideal behind protection of famous marks in general.  Id. New York state 
courts have championed the idea of unfair competition as a basis of protecting some famous marks, 
separate from a famous foreign marks doctrine.  See Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 288 
N.Y.S. 529, 536 (Sup. Ct. 1936); ITC Ltd., v. Punchgini Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 2007); Vaud-
able v. Montmartre Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
19
See Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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1.  Prunier’s
One of the oldest cases dealing with famous foreign marks is Maison Prunier 
v. Prunier’s Restaurant and Café, Inc.20, from 1936.21 In this case, the New York 
Supreme Court examined a situation where a New York restaurant had opened 
with the same name, motif, and menu selection, as a famous contemporary Parisian 
restaurant.22 “Defendants were not satisfied with taking the plaintiff’s name; they 
also took the trade-mark of the plaintiff, alleged in the papers to have been regis-
tered in France, ‘Tout ce qui vient de la mer.’ They printed that on their menu 
with the free translation, ‘Everything that the sea produces.’”23
The court decided that the Parisian restaurant was so famous that it would be 
unfair for another business enterprise to make money off of their fame.24 This de-
cision flew in the face of traditional territorial trademark principles that a mark on-
ly deserved protection in the geographical area where it was used.25  The decision 
reflected the state of technology and sophistication of the New York restaurant 
community in the mid-1930s.  Here, an American state court was willing to protect 
a foreign restaurant in the hopes of stopping consumer confusion as to the source 
connection that restaurant goers had with the famous restaurant all the way across 
the Atlantic Ocean.26
The court was also trying to signal that this kind of behavior was unethical 
and would be punished in New York.  The court scolded the defendants for even 
suggesting that they would uphold the mantle of quality and excellence that the 
famous Parisian restaurant maintained.27
But the court did not have a famous foreign trademark statute with which to 
defend the original Prunier’s mark. Instead, it had to accomplish this protection us-
ing only the shifting laws of equity.28 The court relied on the notion of unfair 
competition to find for the plaintiff.29 It wanted to protect the “goodwill” that the 
Parisian restaurant had accumulated over the generations with its customers.30
By deciding that the trademark from Paris deserved protection, the court es-
tablished common law precedent to protect trademarks which were not attached to 
goods or services in America.31
This is because the Prunier’s court avoided any in-depth discussion detailing 
But, although the Prunier’s case left New York 
with the precedent of protecting famous foreign trademarks using the laws of equi-
ty, it left few crumbs for later courts to digest.  
20 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
21
Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. at 529.
22
Id. at 538.  
23
Id. at 531.
24
Id.
25 Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 907 (2004).
26
See Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
27
Id. at 532.
28
Id. at 555.
29
Id. at 554.  
30
Id. at 552.
31
Id. at 554.
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how it decided that the Prunier’s trademark (“PRUNIER’S”) was famous in the 
first place.  The court merely mentioned that PRUNIER’S must be famous because 
it was the subject of a copycat restaurant.32
Because of this, the Prunier’s case did not settle the state of American law 
regarding protection of famous foreign marks.  First, it was a New York state court 
ruling, not a federal ruling.  Second, no statute was relied on to decide the case, but 
instead the equitable notion of unfair competition was called to action.
No real test was set forth to determine 
fame.  No survey evidence was shown to substantiate a claim.  No laundry list of 
parameters was outlined for later courts to use.  
33
2.  The Stork Club
Third, no 
real test for fame was outlined.  
The next important case that warrants examination is a domestic version of 
Prunier’s.  This time one American restaurant copied another American restaurant 
that was very famous.  In Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus34, the Eastern District 
Court of Pennsylvania found that a Philadelphian copycat was infringing the 
trademark of the famous Stork Club night club in New York City.35
In the 1930’s, a famous social club in New York City called the Stork Club 
(“STORK CLUB”) garnered a good deal of publicity.36 The club became a popu-
lar establishment where rich and famous people would socialize.37 After the origi-
nal STORK CLUB’s rise in popularity, another party opened a nightclub in Phila-
delphia and used the same name and logo as the original.38  When the New York 
STORK CLUB found out, they sued to stop the Philadelphia operation from free-
riding on their goodwill.39 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania was faced with 
similar questions as the Prunier’s court: would consumers be confused as to the 
source of the STORK CLUB trademark?  And if they were confused, did that orig-
inal trademark holder deserve protection in Philadelphia even though it was physi-
cally located and did business in New York?  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
found that confusion could exist and that the original STORK CLUB trademark 
deserved protection, even in Philadelphia.40
The Stork Restaurant case reaffirmed the idea that American courts were 
willing to protect famous trademarks, even if they were attached to goods or ser-
vices sold outside of a certain geographical area.41
32
Maison Prunier, 288 N.Y.S. at 559.
But the test applied by the 
Stork Restaurant Court left much to be desired.  It skirted the fame analysis by 
simply declaring that Philadelphians must have known about the famous trademark 
33
Id. at 554.
34 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
35
Id. at 95.  
36
Id. at 91.  
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Stork Rest. Inc., 36 F. Supp. at 95. 
41
See id.
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due to the amount of advertising the New York STORK CLUB used.42 In fact, the 
court was satisfied without actual evidence of consumer confusion.  Instead, it ac-
cepted the possibility of future confusion as enough to enjoin the defendant.43 The 
court noted that, “[t]hough there has been shown but slight confusion, it requires 
nothing but comparison of the names, insignia and fundamental character of busi-
ness done to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of future confusion.”44 No 
showing of lost profits to the Philadelphian copycat existed either.45
3.  Maxime’s
And once 
again, the court relied on common law unfair competition to decide the case, as no 
statute-based protection existed.
A third example of the use of unfair competition law happened in 1959 when 
the New York state courts tried Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.46 In this case, Max-
ime’s of Paris (“MAXIME’S”) was the famous restaurant which found itself the 
target of a New York copycat.47 Similar to the Prunier’s case, the state court used 
the equitable doctrine of unfair competition to find that the copycat restaurant in-
fringed the famous trademark despite the fact that the famous trademarked restau-
rant was not located in New York.48
The court used, “the doctrine of unfair competition, whose basic principle is 
that commercial unfairness should be restrained whenever it appears that there has 
been a misappropriation, for the advantage of one person, of a property right be-
longing to another.”49
This New York State ruling seemed to cement the idea that a famous trade-
mark exception existed in common law, but because it was another state court de-
cision, it did not add to any national standardization.  It also failed to help stan-
dardize any tests or rules regarding the determination of fame.  
4.  Koffler
As time went on, some parties began to rely heavily on advertising expendi-
tures as proof of fame.50 The need for some kind of quantifiable fame test was 
causing anxiety with trademark owners. Although proof of extensive advertising 
does not always lead to fame, it is some circumstantial evidence of consumer ex-
posure to a brand or trademark.51
42
Id.
This strategy was rewarded in Koffler Store, Ltd.
43
Id. at 94.  
44
Id. (emphasis added).
45
Id. at 93.
46 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
47
Id. at 334.  
48
Id. at 335.  
49
Id.
50
See Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
51
Id.
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v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc.52, where a Michigan court applied the New York idea 
of extensive cross-border advertising as a basis of finding fame.53 In Koffler, the 
court found that a Canadian trademark had gained enough fame to deserve protec-
tion in the United States.54 The court concluded that, “[w]here advertising and 
good will extend beyond the immediate selling market, this reputation will be pro-
tected even though the prior use is far removed from the market of the newcomer, 
and there is little likelihood of his expansion into that market.”55
5.  Mother’s Kitchen
Other parties were not as successful with proving fame through advertising 
expenditures.  This may be because parties were still left to ponder after the Koffler 
decision, the limit of advertising needed to prove fame.  This question arose in a 
case where the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”) refused to offer pro-
tection for Mother’s Kitchen (“MOTHER’S KITCHEN”).  MOTHER’S
KITCHEN was a Canadian restaurant chain which advertised across the United 
States border via television.56 In this case, the TTAB wanted a more concrete 
showing of fame in order to find that the goodwill of the Canadian restaurant was 
in jeopardy in the United States.57 The TTAB found that just any advertising does 
not necessarily create a famous trademark, deserving of protection.58 The TTAB 
compared the level of advertising of the MOTHER’S KITCHEN trademark to the 
Michigan Court’s finding in Koffler.  The TTAB distinguished Koffler and found 
that a high degree of advertising was necessary to produce a famous trademark 
and, therefore, denied protection for MOTHER’S KITCHEN.59
The Mother’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc. case is inter-
esting for a particular reason.  Before this case, the American law on famous for-
eign trademark protection appeared to rest only in state unfair competition law.  
The Lanham Act has no famous marks exception and despite the Paris Conven-
tion’s famous trademark protection provision in Article 6bis, American courts con-
tinued to avoid the invocation of the Convention as American law.  But Mother’s
Restaurants was decided by a federal agency, the TTAB.  This decision marked 
the first invocation of the famous marks doctrine by a federal administrative agen-
cy.  In Mother’s Restaurants, the TTAB cited Lanham Act 2(d) for source confu-
sion, but also Vaudable in mentioning that the famous trademark exemption actual-
ly existed.60
52 434 F. Supp. 697, (E.D. Mich. 1976).
This dicta is significant if for no other reason than it was the first time 
a federal agency had entertained the possibility of a federal famous marks excep-
53
Id. at 704.
54
Id.
55
Id. (citing Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Stork 
Rest., Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941)).
56 Mother’s Rests., Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046 (T.T.A.B. 
1983).  
57
Id. at 1048.  
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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tion.  And TTAB did so while referencing a Lanham Act provision together with 
common law precedent.61
Thereafter, the protection of famous foreign trademarks sat for some time.  It 
languished in state court unfair competition law precedent, different in each state.  
It remained completely absent in states which had never ruled on the issue.  It re-
mained absent from federal statute and hopelessly tied to multiple strings of bisect-
ing and intersecting case law.  No uniform rules and tests were established and no 
concrete protection existed.  But with the dawn of the new millennium came new 
discussions and new cases dealing with the subject.  Would modern courts recog-
nize the problems of the lack of uniformly protecting famous foreign trademarks?
III. CURRENT CASE LAW
A.  Grupo Gigante
Just after 2000, the famous trademark question was thrust back into the spot-
light by a pair of Federal Circuit court rulings on opposite coasts.  In 1983, the 
TTAB had mentioned the famous marks exception at a federal level in Mother’s
Restaurants.62
First, the Ninth Circuit in California found that a famous trademark deserved 
protection in Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc.
Now it was time for other federal courts to discuss the doctrine.  
The question at hand was not only whether the federal courts would entertain a 
famous foreign trademark exception, but if so, what source of law they would refer 
to: common law, state unfair competition law, federal Lanham Act, or the Paris 
Convention?  Also left to be seen was whether the courts would seriously begin a 
standardization process of testing fame.  
63 In that case, an es-
tablished Mexican grocery store chain, looking to expand north of the border, 
found that an established but later created American store had already used its 
name.64  Neither group had registered the trademark (“GIGANTE”) in the United 
States, but the American company had used it in America first.65 The Mexican 
company sued the American company for copycatting, claiming that the grocery 
store name GIGANTE was famous in Mexico.66 It claimed that the American 
company was free riding off of the goodwill, which the Mexican company had 
with the Mexican-American population in southern California.67
61
Id.  Board Member Allen’s concurring opinion in Mother’s includes a dialogue which cautions 
against using advertising alone to constitute use of a trademark in the age of satellite technology for fear 
that it would be “extremely hazardous” to do so without some registration system in place.  Id. at 1050-
51. (Allen, Board Member, concurring).  Allen distinguished Mother’s from Maxime’s for lack of unfair 
competition as it was never established that the MOTHER’S KITCHEN Canadian restaurant was fam-
ous in the United States.  Id.
62
See Mother’s Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1048 (referencing, in dicta, both the Lanham Act 
and Vaudable by the TTAB).
63 391 F.3d 1088, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).  
64
Id. at 1091.  
65
Id. at 1091-92.  
66
Id. at 1091-93.
67
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit analyzed the name GIGANTE in order to decide if it de-
served protection in America, even where the Mexican company had not used it.68
The Ninth Circuit, although deciding the case on other grounds, did go into great 
detail as to the fame needed by the trademark in order to deserve protection in a 
foreign territory.69 The court noted that the established test of secondary meaning, 
alone, was not a sufficient test to determine if enough fame existed in a trademark 
to afford it protection outside of the territory in which it was used.70
In addition, where the mark has not before been used in the American mar-
ket, the court must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substan-
tial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the 
foreign mark. The relevant American market is the geographic area where the de-
fendant uses the alleged infringing mark. In making this determination, the court 
should consider such factors as the intentional copying of the mark by the defen-
dant, and whether customers of the American firm are likely to think they are pa-
tronizing the same firm that uses the mark in another country. While these factors 
are not necessarily determinative, they are particularly relevant because they bear 
heavily on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud, which are the reasons for 
having a famous-mark exception.71
The court ruling demanded concrete survey evidence of secondary meaning 
present in a “substantial percentage” of the “relevant American market.”72 That 
substantial percentage turned out to be in the twenty to twenty-two percent range 
of familiarity in a population of Spanish-speaking Californians.73 By setting the 
parameters as such, the court effectively took a narrow view of the population and 
examined the “relevant market.”74
The Ninth Circuit in Grupo Gigante even addressed the source of the law 
which it used to decide the case by stating that the Paris Convention was not self-
executing American law.75  Instead, the court found that the Paris Convention did 
nothing more than extend the idea of national treatment to American intellectual 
property law.76
By so ruling, the Ninth Circuit placed the possibility of a federal famous for-
eign marks exception front and center.  The court offered a standardization of the 
68
Id. at 1094.  
69 Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004).
70
Id. at 1098.  
71
Id. at 1098. 
72
Id.
73
See id. at 1108 (Graber, J., concurring).
74
Id. Not all judges in Grupo Gigante felt that this was the proper test to administer to find fame.  
In a concurring opinion, Judge Graber called for a more stringent standard for establishing a famous 
trademark in the United States. Id. at 1106.  Judge Graber first cautioned against using pure survey 
evidence to prove fame of a trademark and then criticized the court in Grupo Gigante for sampling a 
narrow population in its test of fame. Id. at 1107-08.  Instead of the twenty-two percent standard which 
was proposed by the majority in Grupo Gigante, Graber argued that a majority, or fifty percent standard 
of familiarity in the potential customers, at the time the mark is first used, is more appropriate. Id. at 
1108.  Still, Graber’s more stringent percentage standard relies on the definition of who “potential cus-
tomers” are and are not.  Id.
75
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1099.  
76
Id.
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test for fame by establishing that a “substantial percentage” of the “relevant popu-
lation” coupled with the secondary meaning test would answer the question.77
Thus, Grupo Gigante marked a large step forward toward the goals of federal rec-
ognition of famous trademark protection and in standardizing the test for fame.78
B.  Bukhara Restaurants
The most recent federal test for famous trademarks came from the east coast.  
This time it was the Second Circuit’s chance to answer the question of whether a 
famous trademark exemption existed on the federal level.
In 2007, an international restaurant chain sued a United States restaurant for 
copying their trademark.79 In this case, the famous restaurant was named Bukhara 
(“BUKHARA”).80 The original BUKHARA restaurant resides in New Delhi, In-
dia and has won numerous accolades.81 After establishing its first location, the 
restaurant expanded and opened other chain locations in Hong Kong, Bangkok, 
Bahrain, Montreal, Bangladesh, Singapore, Kathmandu, Ajman, and also locations 
in New York and Chicago.82 The American BUKHARA restaurants were subse-
quently shut down after a few years of poor business.83
A few years after the BUKHARA restaurants were shut down in the United 
States, a former employee of the restaurant opened his own “BUKHARA” restau-
rant in New York.84  The Indian company sued the American company for trade-
mark infringement and false advertising, relying on the famous foreign trademark 
doctrine.85 The federal district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dants based on the abandonment of the BUKHARA trademark in the United 
States.86 The Second Circuit on appeal dismissed the idea of a federal famous for-
eign trademark exception.87  It found “that Congress has not yet incorporated that 
doctrine into federal trademark law” and affirmed the district court’s ruling.88
The Second Circuit certified certain questions back to the New York state 
courts to ascertain if a state claim for unfair competition existed.89 The New York 
Court of Appeals found that unfair competition was a viable claim under New 
York state law, separate from a famous foreign marks claim, and that even foreign 
companies’ goodwill should be protected from fraud.90
77
Id. at 1098.  
In 2008, the Second Cir-
78
Id.
79 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). 
80
Id.
81
Id. at 142-43.
82
Id. at 143-44.
83
Id. at 146-48.
84
Id. at 144.
85
ITC, 482 F.3d at 142. 
86
Id. at 142.  
87
Id.
88
Id. at 142. 
89
Id.  See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 2007).
90
ITC, 880 N.E.2d at 859 (N.Y. 2007).
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cuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and explained the New York Court of Ap-
peals’ answer on unfair competition.91 The Second Circuit reiterated what the 
New York Court of Appeals ruled, that a test for secondary meaning is necessarily 
coupled with proof that the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff’s mark or 
trade dress.92 The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in requir-
ing a showing of secondary meaning for the name “BUKHARA” and that no ge-
nuine issue of material fact existed regarding the New York consumer’s primary 
association with the Indian company.93  The Second Circuit agreed that the inten-
tional copying actually existed in this case, but that no secondary meaning existed 
for the consumers in the New York area.94
C.  Ramifications of ITC and Grupo Gigante
The Second Circuit’s ruling in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. essentially cut 
down the possibility of a federal famous trademarks exception.  It did so by noting 
that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Grupo Gigante was not based on either the Lan-
ham Act or the Paris Convention and was therefore not binding law.95
But the Second Circuit also left an interesting and difficult precedent for the 
only remaining famous trademark exception of state unfair competition law.  In 
ITC, the Second Circuit, using New York State unfair competition law, examined
whether the name BUKHARA held any secondary meaning for the relevant con-
sumer population.96 But unlike in Grupo Gigante, the ITC ruling seemed to broa-
den the scope of “relevant population” out to the point where no secondary mean-
ing existed.97 Remember, for the Ninth Circuit to find that GIGANTE was famous 
and therefore protectable, the Court examined a narrow population of only those 
“Spanish-speaking, [consumers who] had recently purchased Mexican-style food 
at a supermarket or other food store.”98 Judge Graber wrote in a concurring opi-
nion in Grupo Gigante because he wanted to emphasize that he felt that “any resi-
dents of San Diego County-not just . . . Mexican-Americans-” should have been 
included in an analysis of whether GIGANTE was a famous mark or not.99
This disagreement highlights the very critical point of the “relevant popula-
tion” analysis.  The fundamental definition of who is and who is not in the “rele-
vant population” with which to judge fame is a fundamental question at issue in 
The 
Second Circuit in ITC expanded Judge Graber’s idea and examined an even more 
expansive view of the relevant population. 
91 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2008).  
92
Id. at 161.  
93
Id. at 163.  
94
Id. at 161-62.  
95
ITC, 482 F.3d at 160.  
96
ITC, 518 F.3d at 162.  
97
Id.
98 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004). 
99
Id. at 1108.  Judge Graber also cited Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 
866, 875 (9th Cir. 2002), for the idea that an analysis of the product should dictate the relevant consum-
er population and he felt that a grocery store sells groceries to all people and should therefore dictate a 
larger sample set with which to judge fame.
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any famous trademarks exception analysis.  By siding with the broadest interpreta-
tion of the test as the Second Circuit did in ITC, courts can effectively kill off the 
famous trademarks exception.  This is because the court can decide that the “rele-
vant population” in question is so large that any group who thought the mark was 
famous could be diluted by those who did not.  For example, if the entirety of New 
York were examined as the “relevant population” of restaurant consumers in 1936, 
could Prunier’s have claimed fame as it did?  If the entirety of Pennsylvania had 
been examined in 1951, would the Stork Club have been regarded as famous 
enough for protection? 
It is for this reason, that the court’s decision of who is and who is not in-
cluded as the “relevant population” holds the key to the famous trademark excep-
tion, not to mention which percentage of that population is targeted as the standard.  
If courts are allowed to dilute the fame of a trademark with a large “relevant popu-
lation,” any codified protection of famous trademarks could be erased.  But stop-
ping courts from doing this is a difficult problem indeed.
As we have seen, the definition of “relevant population” is only one of the 
problems that stand in the way of implementing a practical solution to protecting 
famous trademarks in America.  Thus far, we have outlined the problems with the 
historic attempts at protection when courts have used state equity law.  We have 
highlighted the lack of federal protection and demonstrated some of the difficulties 
that new cases have raised.  Next, this note will begin discussing how practical 
changes can be made to American law in order to move forward with protection of 
famous marks.
IV. IMPLEMENTING PRACTICAL CHANGE
It is obvious from the discussion thus far that sufficient protection for famous 
foreign trademarks is lacking in America.  No uniform set of laws exists with 
which to guide business decisions.  Patchwork state unfair competition law per-
vades the legal landscape in different forms in each state.100  No single test is es-
tablished for deciding whether a trademark is famous or not.  Additionally, Ameri-
ca is looking like it is shirking its international duties to uphold protection of 
famous foreign trademarks.101
100
See, e.g., Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 
1976); Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); Stork Rest. v. Marcus,
36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
101 America is a signatory of TRIPS.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81, (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment].  TRIPS Articles 16 (2) and 16 (3) deal with protection of famous trademarks.  TRIPS is based on 
the Paris Convention Article 6bis which also deals with protection of famous trademarks.  See Dinwoo-
die, surpa note 4, at 902 n.59 (stating that it is uncertain as to whether the Paris Convention is self-
executing American law or not, but the United States is a TRIPS signatory).  Although these conven-
tions do not necessitate protecting famous trademarks that are not physically attached to goods sold in a 
particular geographic region, the idea was considered for the Paris Convention.  Note that Article 6bis
of the Paris Convention of 1958 attempted to insert language regarding the non-use requirement but that 
was removed after two dissenting votes were cast.  See Dinwoodie, surpa note 4, at 913 for an in-depth 
look at the idea of use-based trademark requirements and a history of the Paris Convention’s revisions.  
In recognition of protecting famous foreign trademarks, even in areas where they are not attached to 
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These problems can all be remedied.  There are steps that we can take in 
America if we are to extend a uniform protection to famous foreign trademarks.  
But the steps that we need to take are not easy.  They are not things that can be 
written into law and forgotten about.  They are fundamental changes in how we 
perceive American law.  They are fundamental changes in how courts are allowed 
to decide certain points of law.  They are not easy changes, but they must be made.
The second section of this note will detail the practicalities of implementing 
federal protection of famous foreign trademarks in America.  It will analyze the 
hurdles that stand before such implementation including the Commerce Clause and 
also existing common law precedent.  It will outline a practical solution to enacting 
federal protection of famous foreign trademarks in the United States, while con-
ceding that implementation will not be easy.  It will conclude with four steps that 
are necessary if we are to implement federal protection of famous foreign marks in 
America.
A.  The Constitutional Limitations of a Lanham Act Amendment
A statutory answer may be the solution that comes to mind in order to stan-
dardize federal protection of famous trademarks.  This note discussed how statutes 
standardize a particular issue much better than piecemeal common law rules, so 
such a solution looks enticing.  The solution becomes increasingly attractive as the 
statute could be created as an amendment to the existing Lanham Act.  This seems 
almost simple when one recognizes that there are already standards for measuring 
fame that have been established in the anti-dilution section of Lanham Act 43(c), 
the new federal trademark anti-dilution statute.102
goods is a positive step for the world economy, WIPO came out with a joint recommendation on how to 
implement such laws.  See Thirty-fourth Series of Meetings of the Assemblies and Other Bodies of the 
Member States of WIPO, Sept. 20-29, 1999, General Report, ¶¶ 171–83, Doc. A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999) 
[hereinafter WIPO General Report], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_34/
a_34_16.pdf.  Despite the fact that world organizations emphasize the importance of protecting famous 
foreign trademarks, standardized federal protection still does not exist in America.  Compare Grupo 
Gigante, 391 F.3d 1088, with ITC, 518 F.3d 159.
  It would be easy to adapt these 
102 Section 43(c)(1)-(4)(c) of the Lanham Act states:
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of eq-
uity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against 
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such 
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this sub-
section. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may 
consider factors such as, but not limited to-- (A) the degree of inherent or ac-
quired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark 
in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the du-
ration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical 
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for 
the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition 
of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner 
and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent 
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark
was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, 
or on the principal register.  (2) In an action brought under this subsection, the 
owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in 
section 34 unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully in-
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general guidelines from domestic famous marks to famous foreign marks.  But un-
fortunately this simple solution is not so simply executed.
One problem with this idea is that the Lanham Act is a federal statute. It 
reaches only what the United States Congress can lawfully legislate.103
The Lanham Act defines “use in commerce” in a definition section stating, 
“[t]he word ‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress.”
This be-
comes a problem when we look at protecting a famous foreign trademark that is 
not attached to any goods or services sold within the United States.  The Constitu-
tion and specifically the Commerce Clause may limit congressional authority to 
make such a law.
104 Congressional power to regulate commerce is constrained by the 
Constitution and by the courts’ interpretations of the Constitution.105
As the interpretation of these constitutional clauses has changed over the 
years, so too has Congress’ perceived power to regulate.106  Strict constructionists 
like to think that the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
harshly restrict Congressional authority to regulate.107 They argue that Congress 
may only make laws that deal with commerce between the states and international 
commerce.108 More liberal interpretations of the Constitution have allowed Con-
gress a broader power over lawmaking, at times stretching into what could be con-
sidered purely internal state matters.109 This interpretation of Congressional au-
thority to regulate has profound implications on the federal implementation of 
protecting famous foreign trademarks.  If it is determined that Congress has no au-
thority over trademarks that are not “used” in American commerce, then federal 
law over such marks would be unconstitutional. 
tended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. 
If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be en-
titled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the discretion 
of the court and the principles of equity. (3) The ownership by a person of a valid 
registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or 
on the principal register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, 
with respect to the mark, that is brought by another person under the common 
law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness 
of a mark, label or form or advertisement. (4) The following shall not be actiona-
ble under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in com-
parative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or 
services of the owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark. (C) 
All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)-(4)(C) (2006).
103
See U.S. CONST. art. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
104 Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
105 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that “Congress has the 
power to...” “...regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the In-
dian tribes...”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (U.S.1824) is the first of a series of cases which interpret 
the Congressional limits imposed by the commerce clause.  
106
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11-12 (2d ed. 2005).
107
Id.
108
Id.  See also, 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 837 (2009).
109
Id.
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1.  Interpretation of the Commerce Clause Dictates Congressional 
Authority to Protect Famous Foreign Trademarks
The investigation of the Commerce Clause and its historic interpretation 
takes us back to the 1870’s.  By then, the United States Congress had recognized 
trademarks as having a large impact on the burgeoning American economy.  Fed-
eral trademark statutes protecting trademark owners from copycat fraud were 
passed.110 Congress also established a federal trademark registration system in 
1870.111 But in 1879, through review of a group of consolidated trademark cases, 
the Supreme Court declared the federal trademark statute unconstitutional.112
In the consolidated cases entitled In re Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme 
Court looked to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution and only saw the 
federal powers to protect copyright and patents, not trademarks.113  It then looked 
to the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and found that pure in-
trastate commerce, taking place within one state, only by members of that state, 
was beyond the reach of federal regulatory control.114 Because the Court found 
that the federal trademark statutes did not attempt to limit federal control to com-
merce as only between the states or only between America and foreign nations, it 
was found to be unconstitutional.115 The Court even refused to allow the trade-
mark statute to remain in place for interstate and international trade, which were 
areas of commerce that Congress could regulate.116
Because of this ruling, and the negation of the federal laws, trademark law in 
America went back to being a creature of common law.  Trademark rights contin-
ued to exist in common law for a long time after the Trade-Mark cases were de-
cided, partly because of the narrow view of Congressional authority to regulate 
commerce between the states.  But in other areas of law, the Commerce Clause be-
gan to expand to give more regulatory authority to Congress.117  After the turn of 
the twentieth century, industrialization took hold and the Supreme Court began to 
broaden the Commerce Clause’s scope.118
110
See e.g., Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.  See also In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 
U.S. 82 (1879).
This allowed Congress to enact many 
111 “‘Protection for lawful trade-marks may be obtained by individuals, firms, or corporations en-
titled to the same if they comply with the requirements prescribed by the act of Congress; and the provi-
sion is, that a trade-mark duly registered as required shall remain in force thirty years from the date of 
such registration, subject to an exception not necessary to be noticed. 16 Stat. 210; Rev. Stat., sects. 
4937, 4941.’” See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 85 (quoting McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 
(1877).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 93 (referencing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  It does however have a clause dealing with 
copyrights and patents stating Congress has the power “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and 
useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes, to [a]uthors and [i]nventors, the exclusive [r]ight to their 
respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  Because of this, in 
the early days of American trademark law, rights were acquired only by use.  No federal laws regarding 
trademarks existed. 
114
Id. at 96.
115
Id. at 96-97.
116 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98-99.
117
See infra note 130.
118
See infra note 130.
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new federal laws which reached farther and farther into what was previously con-
sidered intrastate commerce.119 By 1946, Congress’ view of the Commerce Clause 
was such that a federal trademark statute was no longer considered unconstitution-
al.120
Still more broadening of Congressional power to regulate took place over the 
next fifty years.
The passage of the Lanham Act signaled a change from previously strict 
views of Congressional authority to regulate trademarks in the United States.  
121 In 1995, however, the Supreme Court signaled a change to this 
trend when it decided United States v. Lopez.122 Lopez showed the Supreme 
Court’s intention to once again narrow the Commerce Clause’s authority for Con-
gress to regulate.123
The subject of Lopez was a federal statute known as the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990.124 This law was a criminal statute which forbade people from 
possessing firearms near public schools.125 The Court found that the statute ex-
ceeded the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several 
states.126 The Supreme Court found that the activities that the law sought to 
preempt were not commercial in nature and did not constitute interstate com-
merce.127 This analysis was not unlike the Supreme Court’s reasoning in In re 
Trade-Mark Cases from 1879.128
Still more tightening of congressional authority to regulate among the several 
states took place over the next two decades.  In 2000, the Supreme Court struck 
down the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison,129 citing 
constitutional limitations.130 Again the Supreme Court found that a lack of com-
mercial activity between states kept federal laws from governing the subject mat-
ter, even if an aggregate of the activity might affect interstate commerce.131
119 See Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 177-84 (1949) (discussing how the Lanham Act dealt with the constitutional 
problem).
120
See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-27 (2006).
121 For a good discussion of how the Commerce Clause’s authority shifted with United States. v. 
Lopez, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153 (2d ed. 2005).
122 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
123
Id. 
124
Id. at 549-50.
125
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)).
126
Id. at 549.
127
Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549-50 with In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-99 (1879).
128
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82.
129 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
130
Id. This case affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s striking of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which was part of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 1902 et seq. It states that “[a]ll 
persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by 
gender.”  42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
131
Id. “As we observed in Lopez, modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has  ‘identified three 
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.’”  Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 558 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).  First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels 
of interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 256 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)). Second, Congress is empo-
wered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
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From these recent cases, it is not a stretch to conclude that the days of unre-
stricted federal law-making powers are over, at least for now.  This means that the 
Commerce Clause stands again as a resolute hurdle for all federally enacted sta-
tutes.132
2.  A Hypothetical Illustration of Why the Commerce Clause is 
Important in a Famous Foreign Marks Discussion
And because the Lanham Act is a federal statute, passed by the United 
States Congress, it is subject to the constitutional limitations found by the courts.  
This affects the famous foreign marks doctrine because the famous trademarks at 
issue are not attached to any goods sold in America.  
Suppose the only place that a particular unregistered trademark was used 
was in a sleepy corner store of Morton, Texas.  There isn’t an interstate highway 
within fifty miles of Morton and the only patrons of the store are also from Mor-
ton.  Use of this trademark would probably not be considered “commerce” that 
Congress could regulate.  If the corner store were on an interstate highway, a good 
argument could be made that using the mark with interstate highway travelers was 
interstate commerce and subject to regulation by Congress.133 But what if the 
people who grew up and lived in Morton were the only people who ever saw this 
trademark?134
Likewise, it would be equally as hard to argue that the federal Lanham Act 
could reach trademarks that were never even used in the United States.  For if the 
Commerce Clause can’t reach west Texas, how could it reach Beijing?  Suppose 
that the hypothetical above replaced Morton with Beijing.  If only people from 
Beijing ever used a trademark in Beijing, surely the United States Congress could 
not regulate its use with the Lanham Act.  But what if it could?  What would it take 
for the Lanham Act to reach into Beijing?  
Then surely it would be hard to argue that this trademark would fall 
under anything but state laws.  
Short of a constitutional amendment, the only conceivable way to do this 
would have to be to modify how we define the terms of the Commerce Clause it-
self.  What if the traditional notions of “use” and “commerce” were redefined?  
What if “using” a trademark included making a goods-source connection instead of 
only physically affixing it to an item sold in America?  What if “commerce” in-
cluded exposing enough Americans to a brand so that the source connection gar-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 
(citing Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern Ry. Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 (1911). Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate 
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
132
But see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding congressional laws criminalizing ma-
rijuana possession even though the laws prohibited purely intrastate activity that did not cross state 
lines). 
133
See Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert 
denied, 502 U.S. 823 (1991) (for a case which finds that a restaurant near an interstate highway is using 
a trademark in interstate commerce).
134
See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959), (ruling on territo-
riality of trademark use in commerce centering on the lack of confusion issue). 
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nered fame?  
As odd as it may sound, this suggestion is not a hypothetical one.  Two re-
cent cases indicate that the federal courts might just be entertaining this method of 
protecting foreign famous foreign trademarks.  This note will next examine how 
these courts attempted to redefine “use” and “commerce” and will critique their 
attempts.  It will find that although they succeeded in redefining traditional trade-
mark usage, the courts missed opportunities to apply the secondary meaning analy-
sis of Lanham Act 43(c) in order to more easily distinguish whether marks were 
famous or not.  Instead of doing so, the courts concocted their own messy solutions 
and came up with ugly precedent.  The first case from 2003, is International Ban-
corp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco and 
the second from 2008 is Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans 
Inc.135
B.  The Fourth Circuit’s Re-definition of “Use in Commerce”
In the first case, the defendant, Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des 
Etrangers a Monaco (“SBM”) owned and operated a group of resorts and casinos 
in Monte Carlo, Monaco.136 One of the established casinos was the Casino de 
Monte Carlo (“CASINO DE MONTE CARLO”) which has operated under that 
name since 1863.137 This trademark was not registered in the United States, but 
was registered in Monaco. 138
The plaintiff in this case was International Bancorp, LLC (“Bancorp”), a 
French-run online gambling group which used the name CASINO DE MONTE 
CARLO on their gambling websites, including in the names of the sites them-
selves.139 The websites not only used the name of the Monte Carlo casino, but also 
used pictures of the actual building’s interior and exterior in order to promote its 
online gambling site.140
When SBM became aware of Bancorp’s websites and their use of the name 
CASINO DE MONTE CARLO along with images of the casino, it challenged 
their use in the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).
Bancorp had no affiliation with the actual casino, which is 
located in Monaco, or SBM, but allegedly used the name and images to bolster its 
caché with online gamblers.  
141 WIPO ap-
pointed a committee to hear the challenge and the result was that WIPO agreed 
with SBM.  They ruled that Bancorp should transfer all of the Casino de Monte 
Carlo websites to SBM.142
135 Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 
359 (4th Cir. 2003); Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001, v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
In order to escape this judgment, Bancorp filed suit in 
136
Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 361.
137
Id. at 363.
138
Id. at 361.
139
Id. at 363. 
140
Id. at 361.
141
Id. at 361-62.
142
Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 361.
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the U.S. Federal Courts for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.  There, 
defendant SBM counterclaimed trademark dilution, infringement, unfair competi-
tion and cybersquatting.143 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia found summary judgment in favor of defendant SBM on the 
counts of trademark infringement and cybersquatting, but ruled against SBM on 
the trademark dilution and unfair competition claims for failure to prove damag-
es.144 The court awarded $51,000,000 to SBM and ordered a transfer of forty-
three of Bancorp’s fifty-three website domain names to SBM.145 Plaintiff Bancorp 
appealed that decision to the Fourth Circuit.146
On appeal, plaintiff Bancorp argued that SBM didn’t have a protectable in-
terest in its trademark in the United States because it was (1) unregistered; and (2) 
not used in commerce in the United States.147
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by defining “use in commerce” by stat-
ing that the Lanham Act required “services SBM provided under the “Casino de 
Monte Carlo” mark [to be] rendered in commerce . . . “
This was true in the sense that SBM 
did not have a registered trademark in America, and the only casino operated by 
SBM was located in Monaco.  SBM would have to overcome these hurdles to win 
its infringement suit.
148 The court then noted 
that it was the Constitution’s Commerce Clause that limits the Lanham Act’s scope 
of authority to regulate interstate and foreign trade.149
The lower court had found trademark infringement of SBM’s trademark be-
cause of a New York office owned by SBM.150  SBM used the office to advertise 
trips to their casinos and resort properties in Monaco.151  It was disputed whether 
or not one could actually book a trip to the casino by walking into the office.152
SBM maintained that this was use in commerce: advertising, running the office, 
booking reservations in America with American consumers.153 Bancorp contended 
that the only thing happening at the New York office was “mere[ly] advertising”
and that the real services rendered by SBM were only in Monaco at their casino 
itself.154
Although the district court found that this office was SBM’s link to “use in 
commerce” in the United States, the Fourth Circuit found that it was not.155
143
Id. at 361-62.
In-
stead, the Fourth Circuit found that even if SBM booked trips to their Monaco 
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 362.
147
Id. at 363.
148
Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363. 
149
Id. at 363-64.  
150
Id. at 364-65.
151
Id. at 365.
152
Id. at 364. The Fourth Circuit quoted the district court, which found that reservations could be 
booked in the New York office, but notes that the plaintiff disputed that any booking could be accom-
plished there and that the office was merely used for advertising. Id.
153
Id.
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Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 365. 
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Id.
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properties, it was trips to other properties and not to their casinos.156
Without the New York office link to “use in American commerce,” SBM 
needed some other way for the Lanham Act to reach them.  This is where the 
Fourth Circuit used a bold step to take the Lanham Act to Monaco.  
In order to find that SBM’s trademark was “used in commerce,” the court 
asked if American citizens had ever gone to the Monaco casino and gambled 
there.157 The court found that “foreign trade” could be found if American tourists 
gambled at the foreign casino.158
Because SBM used its mark in the sale and advertising of its gambling ser-
vices to United States citizens; because its rendering of gambling services to Unit-
ed States citizens constitutes foreign trade; because foreign trade is commerce 
Congress may lawfully regulate; and because commerce under the Lanham Act 
comprises all commerce that Congress may lawfully regulate, the services SBM 
renders under the “Casino de Monte Carlo” mark to citizens of the United States 
are services rendered in commerce, and the “use in commerce” requirement that 
the Lanham Act sets forth for the mark’s protectability is satisfied.
The Fourth Circuit summed up its reasoning 
when it stated,
159
This assertion certainly seemed to cast a wide net for the Lanham Act.  The 
Fourth Circuit court’s ruling was that the Commerce Clause now follows Ameri-
can tourists on holiday based on the international prong of the Commerce 
Clause.160  If an American tourist steps into a back alley shop in Hong Kong, the 
Commerce Clause follows him.  If an American tourist buys a Turkish candy bar, 
that trademark has now been “used” in America.  The same could be said for ser-
vice marks.  Applying this logic, an American citizen visiting London who buys a 
manicure in a London boutique has just “used” that boutique’s trademark in Amer-
ica.161
C.  Ramifications of the Fourth Circuit’s Two-Pronged Test Found in 
International Bancorp
Played out in such hypotheticals, the International Bancorp holding seems 
absurd.  The possible ramifications of such a ruling could trickle into unforeseen 
areas of law with odd consequences.  If this ruling means that the only thing 
needed to satisfy the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement is an Ameri-
156
Id.  This decision could have been the Fourth Circuit’s way around the fact that the district court 
had found summary judgment for SBM, despite there being a factual dispute. “The plaintiff companies 
argue, to the contrary, that there is no evidence in the record that the New York office books reserva-
tions to the casino, and that, as a result, the office engages in no activity beyond ‘mere advertising.’” Id.
at 364. If the court found that booking trips to Monaco was “use in commerce” the question of whether 
a person could or could not book a trip to Monaco from this New York storefront would surely be a 
genuine issue of material fact for the fact finder.  If so, the Fourth Circuit would have been forced to 
remanded the case and reverse the summary judgment.
157
Id. at 366.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 370.
160
Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 367.
161 The court also required an advertising prong, which is dealt with later in the note.  See infra
notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
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can purchasing trademarked goods or using service-marked products abroad, then 
would that also establish the mark’s priority rights in America?162
The TTAB is then forced to hold a hearing to decide what to do with the two 
companies’ applications.  In the hearing, both companies are asked if they have 
ever “used the trademark” in American commerce and, if so, when.  The Canadian 
company says that it has only used the mark in Canada and only sold to Canadian 
consumers since 2000.  The French company says that an American in Paris 
bought one of its bars in August 2005 and that is why it decided to start exporting 
to America.  According to International Bancorp, that purchase would satisfy the 
Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement and the TTAB would have to rule 
that the French company has priority of the mark in the United States.
This slant of the 
hypothetical deserves more discussion.  Let us say that a Canadian company makes 
a chocolate bar with the trademark Goody Good Bar (“GOODY GOOD BAR”)
and sells only in Canada to Canadians starting in 2000.  Then, a French company 
sells its own chocolate bar with the French trademark of GOODY GOOD BAR in 
France starting in August 2005.  At the chocolate bar release party in Paris, an 
American buys one and eats it in Paris.  The American mentions to the company 
representative that these bars would surely sell well in the American market as no 
GOODY GOOD BARs are currently on sale there.  In September 2005, the Cana-
dian company, now large enough to ponder exportation of its chocolate bars, gets 
the notion to head south and begin selling the bars in America.  That month, the 
Canadian company files an intent to use application for GOODY GOOD BARs 
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).  In October 2005, 
the French company decides that it, too, is ready to export its chocolate bars to 
America and files its own intent to use application with the USPTO for the bars, 
styled GOODY GOOD BAR.  
163
To change the hypothetical and illustrate another point, suppose that the 
French company did not file an intent to use application but instead just consistent-
ly sold its chocolate bars to Americans on vacation in Paris from August 2005 on-
ward.  An American company stands up and begins to sell its own GOODY 
GOOD BARs in America in September 2005.  Then in 2008, the French company 
learns of the American company’s use of the mark and files a trademark registra-
tion with the USPTO, challenging the American company’s registration.  The 
French company asserts that it can prove “use in commerce” dating back to August
2005 when it first started selling bars to Americans.  The American company can 
only trace its sales to Americans back to September 2005.  According to Interna-
tional Bancorp, the TTAB would have to award priority to the French company for 
selling its goods to Americans in Paris even though the American company had 
actually sold its goods in America for some time.  
The consequences of these hypotheticals can be readily identified.  It would 
throw a large degree of uncertainty into every formulation in determining when a 
company first “used” its trademark in commerce in America.  It would leave the 
162 It is important to explore these possibilities as SBM has not been overruled and is technically,
therefore, still good law. 
163
See supra Part III.B.
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door open for foreign trademark owners to come to America whenever they wished 
and challenge a trademark based on its “use” of the mark with Americans traveling 
abroad.  It would expand the secondary meaning analysis to a worldwide scale.  It 
would raise critical questions such as: what about Americans living abroad?  Does 
commerce with ex-patriots count as “use” in American commerce?  
The International Bancorp court also mentioned advertising in its analysis.  
The court found that advertising alone was not enough to establish “use in com-
merce.”164  But throughout its explanation of why it found that SBM had used its 
mark in American commerce, it noted that SBM’s advertising had been directed 
toward Americans.165
Perhaps this was behind the court’s attempt to add a second prong to its new 
test: use in commerce is satisfied if you sell to an American abroad and advertise 
in the United States.  It seems that this test was used by the Fourth Circuit to dis-
tinguish the International Bancorp case from Person’s Co. v. Christman.166 The 
Fourth Circuit pointed out that in Person’s the Japanese company did not advertise 
in the United States and, therefore, selling to one American on holiday did not ful-
fill the use in commerce requirement.167
But merely adding the “advertising directed toward Americans” prong does 
not make the test any more palatable.  The test is still amorphous.  How much ad-
vertising is necessary?168 Is one storefront in New York enough?  What about the 
Internet?  What if Person’s had a website of its own (which it does, 
www.persons.com) that is accessible to Americans?169
The dissenting judge in International Bancorp, Judge Motz, saw the negative 
consequences of this new definition of use in commerce and vigorously voiced 
them.
Is that enough advertising?  
Is that, coupled with one sale to an American, “use in commerce”?  What if Per-
son’s had an advertising sign on the side of a Japanese soccer field and an Ameri-
can cable channel showed that game on television?  Would that, coupled with a 
sale to an American on vacation in Tokyo, constitute “use in commerce”?  The 
Fourth Circuit’s vague and undefined attempt to supplant a real secondary analysis 
in SBM with a new test – sell to one American and direct some advertising toward 
Americans – leaves much to be desired.
170
164
Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 364.
Judge Motz noted that this new formulation of use in commerce “threat-
ens to wreak havoc over this country’s trademark law and would have a stifling 
165
Id. at 373. The court even found that it was improper to state that the SBM trademark had been 
exclusively used in Monaco, where advertising and marketing in the United States had occurred.  Id.
166 Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
167
Id. at 1568-69.  But courts have rejected the claim that mere advertising alone does not consti-
tute “use in commerce” in America.  See Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the ad hoc distribution in the United States of an Italian restaurant’s t-shirts, key chains, and cards 
by the owner of the restaurant who was also the owner of a modeling agency to his colleagues in the 
modeling industry did not establish that the mark was used in commerce).
168
See Mother’s Rests. Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046 (T.T.A.B. 
1983) (discussing advertising as a way of deciphering fame but failing to outline a strong test for doing 
so).
169 The Fourth Circuit seemed to think that an Internet webpage was relevant in Int’l Bancorp.
170
Id. at 388-89 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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effect on United States commercial interests generally.”171
But whatever your feelings about the court’s ruling in International Bancorp,
it is important to point out the tactic the court used to spread the authority of the 
Lanham Act from America to Monaco.  In order to get around the Commerce 
Clause, the Fourth Circuit redefined the terms of the clause.172
It is also important to point out that the court in International Bancorp sides-
tepped an opportunity to apply the secondary meaning analysis found in the Lan-
ham Act.
In this way, it used 
the Lanham Act to reach a trademark that would not have otherwise been found to 
have been “used” in the United States.  This profound reasoning has far-reaching 
repercussions on the famous foreign trademark doctrine going forward.
173 Instead, it made up its own messy two-pronged test to decide whether 
the mark held some secondary meaning or not.174
D.  An Example of Another Common Law Test
In the next case, Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans 
Inc.,175 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
dealt with a situation in high fashion.176 The established company was a Danish 
one called Bestseller.177 Its Jack & Jones (“JACK & JONES”) label became very 
popular throughout Europe, Asia, South America and the Middle East, starting in 
1991.178 Bestseller moved to expand to North America by registering for a Cana-
dian trademark in August 2004 and then for an American trademark in December 
2004.179 Unfortunately for Bestseller, Fame Jeans beat it to the registration of 
JACK & JONES in America by filing an intent to use application in January 
2004.180 Nine days after filing for the American trademark, Bestseller filed an op-
position of Fame Jeans’ registration with the TTAB.181 The TTAB found in favor 
of Fame Jeans on summary judgment because Bestseller had never used the trade-
mark in America and Fame Jeans had applied to register it first.182 The district 
court dismissed the new complaints, holding that Bestseller should have raised 
them with the TTAB originally.183 The district court also found that Bestseller’s
complaint failed to meet a supposed new pleading standard.184
After a further appeal, the court of appeals found that the district court had 
171
Id. at 388.
172
See supra Part III.B.
173
See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (outlining the secondary meaning analysis 
for famous trademarks used in America).
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See supra Part III.B.
175 525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Id.
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Id. at 11.
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incorrectly waived Bestseller’s new claims of infringement and disagreed with the 
district court’s interpretation of the new pleading requirements.  Even so, the court 
of appeals could not agree to all of Bestseller’s arguments.  Therefore, it affirmed 
the ruling in part and reversed in part.185
Bestseller first asserted that an intent to use application required actual use in 
order for the intent to use priority date to count.  Since Fame Jeans had not sold 
anything in the United States before Bestseller, Bestseller argued that its intent to 
use date was invalid.  By so arguing, Bestseller was trying to redefine the intent to 
use doctrine.  The court refused to redefine the intent to use priority date in this 
way and dismissed this claim by Bestseller.186
The next argument by Bestseller was the more interesting of the arguments.  
The court analyzed whether Bestseller had “used” its trademark in the United 
States before Fame Jeans’ intent to use application was filed in January of 2004.  
The court first dismissed the idea that Bestseller had “constructively used” the 
mark in America.187
But Bestseller did not claim constructive use; it claimed actual use of the 
mark in the United States.  Without selling a single item of clothing, Bestseller as-
serted that its JACK & JONES trademark was used through “analogous use” of the 
mark.  Bestseller claimed that “regular business contacts, after-sales services, ad-
vertising of various forms, and marketing” should constitute use of the mark in 
America.188 The court found that short run ads or press releases would not be 
enough.  It required that the American public create an identifiable link with the 
trademark to find analogous use.189
The analogous use idea in American trademark law is murky at best.190 In
Fame Jeans, the court of appeals placed extraordinary faith in the analogous use 
idea to somehow find that the internationally famous jeans company possessed 
rights to its JACK & JONES trademark in America.  This faith seems especially
questionable because of the dearth of actual advertising or promotional sales of the 
JACK & JONES trademark conducted by Bestseller in America.191
185
Id. at 23.
  Nevertheless, 
the court signaled its intention to stretch the definition of “use” to its logical ends 
in order to protect what it thought was underhanded and improper registration of 
186
Id. at 18-19.
187
Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 19.  Constructive use under § 7(c) is when a foreign trademark ap-
plicant applies for a trademark in a foreign country, followed by a timely American filing under § 44(d).  
But for Bestseller, there was a thirteen-year gap between its 1991 Danish registration and its December 
2004 American application.  The court could not stretch the six month filing deadline to thirteen years 
in order to find that Bestseller had availed itself of § 44(d).  Id.
188
Id. at 20.
189
Id.
190 To fully comprehend the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s 
use of the analogous use doctrine, a case study is useful.  One of the textbook cases on the issue is Mar-
yland Stadium Authority v. Becker, 36 F.3d 1093 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).
191
See Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 20 (indicating that only small test marketing analyses were con-
ducted by Bestseller).  “Bestseller actually does say it conducted ‘research and marketing for use of the 
mark within the United States.’”  Id. Contrast this with the three-year marketing and advertising that 
the Maryland Stadium Authority conducted with the “CAMDEN YARDS” trademark in Maryland Sta-
dium, 36 F.3d 1093.
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someone else’s trademark by Fame Jeans.
Although the analogous use idea is beyond the scope of this note, the Fame 
Jeans case demonstrates another missed opportunity that the federal courts could 
have used to apply the Lanham Act’s secondary meaning analysis in order to de-
termine fame.  Instead of using a statutorily constructed set of pre-defined rules, 
the court instead decided to unnecessarily delve into the confusing and unclear 
world of analogous use.  Had the trademark JACK & JONES been subjected to the 
analysis of section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, it may have been found to be famous, 
and the resulting analysis would have rested more steadily on a bedrock of statuto-
ry guidelines. 
V. SOLUTION TO PROTECTING FAMOUS FOREIGN MARKS
Thus far, we have established that the current state of the law which protects 
famous foreign marks in America is founded on inconsistent common law.192 We
have established that protection of these marks is worth our time for the sake of 
uniformity and to aid in international business transactions, not to mention to live 
up to our international promises.193
1. To redefine “use in commerce” of a trademark to include fame: the 
situation when a substantial percentage of a relevant population 
makes a goods-source connection with a mark thereby making that 
mark famous;
Although we understand that this protection is 
desirable, we are still left with the puzzle of how to practically implement this pro-
tection in the United States.  Clearly courts are struggling with the practicalities of 
protection, even though they, too, seem to grasp the importance of its worth.  The 
good news is that there are steps that we can take to protect the famous foreign 
trademarks and to standardize that protection.  The bad news is that the steps are 
not easily accomplished.  The steps outlined here are a series of changes and adap-
tations that must take place systematically in order for America to firmly establish 
a new twenty-first century trademark doctrine.  These steps are all intertwined and 
are interdependent, but, for ease of discussion, they are broken out into subsets 
here: 
2. To amend the Lanham Act to include protection of famous foreign 
trademarks.  This is now only possible because of the clarified defi-
nition of “use” which allows amendment and enforcement of the 
federal statute (Lanham Act) under the Commerce Clause; 
3. To use the pre-existing guidelines of section 43 of the Lanham Act to 
help define what is and what is not a famous foreign trademark; and 
finally,
4. To narrowly define the “relevant population” used in the analysis of 
fame in order to prevent a total obliteration of the doctrine by the 
courts’ interpretations.
192
See supra Part III.
193
See supra note 103.
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A.  Redefine “Use in Commerce” of a Trademark to Include Source 
Connections
Tied into this step is a normative shift in order to get over the Commerce 
Clause’s “use in commerce” requirement and allow implementation of a federal 
statute.  Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act  requires this normative shift as a neces-
sary part of its secondary meaning analysis.  By formally clarifying how a trade-
mark is “used” in commerce, we can pull away from the antiquated definition 
which required physical attachment to a good or service found in a particular area.  
Instead, the proper definition of “use” should include the recognition by the rele-
vant American consumer population of a famous trademark.  The ramifications of 
making this shift are to avoid a constitutional battle when the Lanham Act is 
amended.  
This re-definition is not a radical departure of the traditional trademark defi-
nition.  To “use” a trademark in commerce means to use it in trade and allow 
people to buy goods with the mark attached to it.194
Two consumers watch television and surf the Internet.  They are exposed to 
ads regarding different brands of peanut butter: X and Y.  They see bus signs on 
their way to the store espousing the different brands.  They hear advertising clips 
play on the satellite radio on their walk from the bus stop.  When they get to the 
store, they both peruse the aisles and take account of the different kinds of peanut 
butter.  They look at the labels, they recognize the brands and they make their pur-
chases based on what they know about the brands.  The first consumer recalls all 
the advertising that she saw that day and settles on brand X.  The second consumer 
remembers a particular ad about brand Y, which is not being sold in his store.  In-
stead of making a purchase, he decides not to buy any of the offered brands be-
cause he desires brand Y.
But using a trademark means 
more than that.  Trademarks are also “used” when they create a goods-source con-
nection with consumers.  This is demonstrated using the following hypothetical: 
It is clear that in this scenario both consumers “used” trademarks to make 
their decisions, even though the second consumer did not buy anything at all.  The 
second consumer was aware of brand Y and desired it even though he could not 
buy it in his store.  If enough people similarly desired brand Y and felt that it was a 
good product, then brand Y has certainly generated goodwill and a reputation to 
uphold with those consumers.  This is true even if those particular customers can-
not immediately purchase brand Y at the corner store.  To allow another company 
to steal the goodwill that brand Y has created is just as bad as allowing another 
company to steal the goodwill of brand X which is available locally to these con-
sumers.  In fact, this goods-source connection lies at the heart of a trademark’s
purpose.
Old notions of what constitutes “use” of a trademark no longer apply.  Some 
have considered a trademark “used” only where its product is sold. But today, ex-
posure to global trademarks has reached a new zenith.  We know that the advent of 
new technologies can bring about new definitions of legal terms.  Therefore, I 
194 Dinwoodie, supra note 4, at 888.
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submit that a person in America, who watches a foreign soccer match on televi-
sion, “uses” the trademarks painted on the field that he subjectively sees, interna-
lizes, and connects to a source.  If enough members of a “relevant consumer popu-
lation” create this goods-source connection, fame ensues and the trademark has 
served its purpose.195
B.  Amend the Lanham Act to Provide Uniform Protection
This fame should be recognized as fulfilling the trademark 
“use” requirement in regards to the Commerce Clause.
After the first step is established, it will allow us to amend the Lanham Act 
without fear that such a step will be considered unconstitutional.  This is because 
we can now consider foreign trademarks as being “used in commerce” when they 
reach a certain level of fame.  Because the trademarks are foreign, Congress would 
have the authority to regulate the commerce as between the United States and for-
eign nations.196
This is a critical step as we have come to realize that federalizing the protec-
tion of famous foreign trademarks is the most efficient way to standardize protec-
tion.  Although recognizing that statutory law is by no means a perfect and magic 
solution, it affords the best opportunity to work from a single set of guidelines and 
thereby maximize uniformity.  By placing the protection of famous foreign trade-
marks into a federal statute, many of the common law uncertainties will be re-
solved.197 Piecemeal, old, murky and uncertain common law precedent will be 
crystallized into a set of rules that apply in all states.198
195 “Relevant consumer population” is dealt with later in this note and is another central factor in 
defining fame itself.  See infra Part IV.D.
Foreign companies will 
have an answer to the question of how to protect their marks in America.  This will 
foster better investment opportunities and make business forecasts easier to calcu-
late.  Courts will also have a statutorily based set of rules upon which to base their 
interpretations.  This change will also enable the federal courts to hear cases of na-
tional infringement or dilution of famous foreign trademarks.
196
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
197 Although some scholars have advocated for a federal registration system for famous trade-
marks, this is an unnecessary step.  There are so many famous foreign marks that only companies look-
ing to protect their rights in America would be relevant.  The scope of such a registry would be overly 
burdensome and costly.  See Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registration System for Famous Trade-
marks, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1097 (2003) (advocating for a domestic registry of this type).
198 Another idea is to allow federal common law of unfair competition to develop or draw upon the 
Paris Convention to do so.  This has been rejected by the courts.  See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Section 44 and the Paris Convention therefore interact as fol-
lows: [a] foreign national is entitled to the same ‘effective protection against unfair competition’ to 
which an American is entitled, Paris Convention, art. 10bis, and in turn, the American gets the same 
right that the foreign national gets. We treat Mattel like a foreign national, who is treated like an Ameri-
can under the Paris Convention. Accordingly, Mattel is entitled to assert a cause of action under the 
Lanham Act for trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, or for false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125, or it may assert state law claims for unfair competition, as it did. But Mattel has no claim to a 
nonexistent federal cause of action for unfair competition. As said, the Paris Convention provides for 
national treatment, and does not define the substantive law of unfair competition. We therefore reject 
Mattel’s argument that a treaty provision providing for ‘national treatment’ gives it more protections 
against foreign nationals than it has against U.S. nationals.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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C.  Use the Lanham Act’s Existing Secondary Meaning Analysis for 
Determining Whether a Mark is Famous199
The current case law coupled with section 43 of the Lanham Act can act as a 
guide to the new federal secondary meaning analysis.200 This is because section 
43 of the Lanham Act is already established as a federal test for determining if 
domestically used marks are famous.201 The question of secondary meaning 
should revolve around whether the relevant consumer population has formed a 
source connection with the trademark.  Factors found in section 43, such as adver-
tising, promotions, duration of use, and extent of use can all be analyzed at this 
stage by the litigants.  Then existing case law regarding secondary meaning would 
also be used by the litigants in their analysis.  Survey data and the metrics found in 
section 43 would be used as evidence that their mark is famous or their rival mark 
is not.202
But even if the established guidelines of section 43 of the Lanham Act are 
used, it will still be the courts’ interpretations of the guidelines that determine 
whether a mark is famous.  This analysis will necessarily be developed over time 
while case law on the subject evolves.  But to begin, a general standard should be 
set for famous foreign marks, separate from famous domestic marks.  Like the
court in Grupo Gigante noted, the test for famous foreign trademarks should be a 
slightly higher one than that implemented for domestic marks.  This is due to the 
fact that the new definition of “use” will have to supplant the old definition of sell-
ing the goods with a mark attached to them in a given location.  When we make 
this substitution, we need to ensure that the mark is truly known in the area where 
protection is sought.  Affixing the mark to a good sold in the area is presumed use, 
whereas using the mark by creating a goods–source connection must be proved.  
Therefore, the standard should be higher than when fame is coupled with physical 
use.  I would suggest what has come to be known as a “secondary meaning plus”
standard for finding the appropriate level of fame.203
199 Another place to find definitions of fame is the WIPO General Report, supra note 103, ¶¶ 171-
83, but, however, its analysis leaves something to be desired.  Sections (2)(d) and (3)(b) of the recom-
mendation’s Determination of Whether a Mark is a Well-Known Mark in a Member State combine in a 
very confusing manner to state a foreign famous trademarks exception, but to the fame element as well 
as the use element.  Id. ¶ 183.  This type of protection, of marks that are famous outside of the state pro-
tecting the mark, misses the point of protecting the consumer’s source connection with a famous trade-
mark and is not recommended in this note’s “Solution” section.
200
See Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
secondary meaning and the requirement that a substantial percentage of the relevant population must 
also have a source connection with the mark).
201
See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).  Although section 43(c) of the Lanham Act 
has its drawbacks, it is still a solid federal statute upon which we can base the decision of fame.  Fur-
ther, reformation of section 43(c) could one day include a more clear hierarchy of which factors should 
weigh more heavily in a fame analysis than others.
202 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (dealing with secondary meaning 
analysis and also with survey evidence); Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 
1079 (7th Cir. 1988) (dealing with secondary meaning analysis and also with survey evidence).
203
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098 (“But secondary meaning is not enough.  In addition, where 
the mark has not before been used in the American market, the court must be satisfied, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is 
familiar with the foreign mark. The relevant American market is the geographic area where the defen-
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This approach should alleviate the problems that drove recent courts to adopt 
their own poor tests as common law stand-ins for secondary meaning analysis, 
such as the tests the International Bancorp court and the Fame Jeans court used.204
This errant pioneering would not be necessary if every court dealt with the 
same statutory framework of analyzing fame.  For instance, had the court applied 
the tests of section 43 of the Lanham Act, CASINO DE MONTE CARLO might 
well have been found to be famous in International Bancorp.  Likewise, Bestseller 
would have been given the opportunity to prove that its JACK & JONES trade-
mark was famous in America.  It would also have given the opposing parties a fair 
opportunity to present evidence that these trademarks were not famous in America, 
no matter how famous they were in other countries, and that therefore there was no 
goodwill to protect in America.
Instead of asking whether a trademark was famous, i.e., that Americans knew it 
existed and that is why it deserved protection, the courts instead bogged them-
selves down with wayward new tests and murky analyses.  
205
D.  Define the “Relevant Consumer Population” Narrowly
This system affords each side the best opportu-
nity to understand the criteria for proving fame in a practical litigation situation 
and best unifies the standard nationwide.
This last step is crucial in allowing protection of famous foreign marks to 
flourish in the United States.  It is suggested more as a cautionary flag than any-
thing else.  We have seen how courts can read out certain types of protection by 
defining the relevant population base so widely that no trademark could ever be 
considered famous.206
As we saw in Grupo Gigante, the court’s definition of the “relevant popula-
tion” will make or break a case.  If courts take a narrow approach in analyzing “re-
levant population” and only look at Spanish-speaking grocery store shoppers near 
San Diego,
Courts must not be allowed to do this and consequently 
nullify the Lanham Act’s famous foreign marks protection from the bench.
207 or only Philadelphia night club regulars,208 or only well-to-do New 
York restaurant frequenters,209
dant uses the alleged infringing mark. In making this determination, the court should consider such fac-
tors as the intentional copying of the mark by the defendant, and whether customers of the American 
firm are likely to think they are patronizing the same firm that uses the mark in another country. While 
these factors are not necessarily determinative, they are particularly relevant because they bear heavily 
on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud, which are the reasons for having a famous-mark excep-
tion.”).
it will affect the analysis of whether to award pro-
tection.  If, on the other hand, courts take an expansive view of “relevant popula-
204
See Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003); Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001, v. Fame James Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 20 
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
205
See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the court did not 
care that “PERSON’S” was established as a brand and famous in Japan).
206
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding that the relevant popula-
tion was so expansive that it would be hard for almost any trademark to be considered famous).
207
See Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1088.
208
See Stork Rest., Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941).  
209
See Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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tion” and look at all citizens of Southern California who shop for groceries, or all 
people living near New York City and Philadelphia, or every person in New York 
state, that would certainly push the analysis away from protection.210 As has been 
shown time and time again, the scope of the relevant population analysis dictates 
the outcome of the case.211
The scope of relevant population will necessarily be a decision made by the 
courts based on precedent and whatever the current affinity of protecting famous 
foreign marks exists at the time the case is decided.  That is just how precedent-
based decision making works in America.  But to protect truly famous marks, the 
scope should be set as narrowly as possible to provide protection with which to be-
gin. As cases develop, courts will certainly modify the scope of analysis when 
facts warrant, remembering that the wider the scope, the less protection for famous 
foreign trademarks.212
It is important to note that this “relevant population” analysis is necessarily 
coupled with the standard of survey evidence needed to decide fame.  For deciding 
what percentage of the population must have the goods-source connection is as 
important in defining the “relevant population.” Some advocate a fifty-one percent 
majority.213 Others define a “substantial percentage” at around a quarter of the 
population.214 I would argue that the scope of the relevant population is inversely 
related to the resulting percentage of the population necessary to conclude that 
fame exists.  If in one case an entire state is polled regarding a particular mark, 
then a lower percentage should be necessary to prove fame.  If a narrow set of the 
population is polled, such as in Grupo Gigante, then a resulting higher percentage 
would be needed to show fame.  Stating concrete percentages beyond a “secondary 
meaning plus” type standard might be getting ahead of ourselves at this point.  
Survey evidence is malleable.  The definition of “relevant population” is mallea-
ble.  The two are so intertwined that at this stage a flexible secondary meaning plus 
standard for fame is most helpful.  
210 Another aspect of this type of narrowing can be seen in Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1166-67 (T.T.A.B. 2001), where the TTAB so broadened the scope of fame 
that Toro lawnmowers were not considered famous except in the lawn mowing industry.  
211 See the South African case McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (PTY) Ltd.
1996 (82) ZASCA 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.) for a very good example of an interesting “relevant consumer pop-
ulation” analysis and how this analysis can make or break a case.  In Joburgers, the court in South Afri-
ca narrowly focused on the population of those who had traveled to other countries where McDonald’s 
restaurants were located, ignoring the vast majority of the domestic population who had never traveled 
abroad or even seen a McDonald’s restaurant.  See id.
212 Here, section (3)(a)(iii) of WIPO’s Determination of Whether a Mark is a Well-Known Mark in 
a Member State does a good job outlining that a member cannot use the “public at large” as a means to 
measure if a mark is famous or not as this would essentially kill any possible findings that a mark was 
famous.  WIPO General Report, supra note 103, ¶ 183.
213 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., 
concurring) (advocating a majority in his concurrence, whereas the majority seemed to advocate a twen-
ty to twenty-two percent standard).
214
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Trademarks are used throughout the world to expedite commercial interac-
tions and aid consumer decision making.  When governments step in to ensure that 
certain trademarks are used only by their corresponding owners and nobody else, 
companies are able to forge bonds with their consumer bases and consumers can 
feel assured of a uniform quality of products that they choose.  Trademarks are tra-
ditionally based on certain pillars which define what they are and how they can be 
used.  Territoriality and actual use in commerce are those traditional pillars.  This 
seemingly simple construct is upset, however, when a company’s trademark be-
comes famous.  Through the technological wonders of the twenty-first century, it is 
now possible to become exposed to all the world’s trademarks without ever leaving 
your couch.  This presents a problem when certain trademarks are exposed to a re-
levant consumer population that does not have ready access to the products tied to 
those marks and that population makes a source connection with the goods.  
For all the reasons that governments protect trademarks used at home, it is 
equally important to protect famous trademarks which are not.  But the United 
States has been slow to standardize this protection.  Although implementing the 
protection will not be easy, it is an important thing for America to do.  By follow-
ing the steps outlined in this note, we can institute real standardized protection for 
truly famous trademarks.  If we fail to take these steps, we will continue to be pla-
gued by a mire of conflicting case law and unsure protections.  It is unfortunate 
that today’s trademark law in such an important area is in such disarray.  But like 
the famous foreign trademarks problem, this disarray is nothing new.  It is telling 
that a seventy-year-old quote about this same subject still rings true today.  As the 
New York Supreme Court and Nims stated in 1936, it seems as if the state of the 
law regarding protection of famous foreign trademarks is still “in a most unsatis-
factory state.”215
215 Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 557 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (quoting 
NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 568 (3d ed. 1929) (lamenting the state of law protect-
ing famous foreign trademarks)).
